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Rh claim: distinguishing between discretionary and nondiscretionary review.

Switching gears, the Government suggests that §1252(d)(1) excludes only remedies made discretionary by statute, while reconsideration and reopening are made discretionary by regulation. Id., at 39–40. True, Congress elsewhere focused on discretion specified by statute. We considered such a provision in Kucana v. Holder, addressing administrative actions “ ‘the authority for which is specified under this subchapter to be in the discretion of the Attorney General.’ ” 558 U. S., at 237 (quoting §1252(a)(2)(B)(ii)). But §1252(d)(1) draws no such line. It simply covers remedies that are “available … as of right.” Whether that characteristic is established by statute or regulation makes no difference.

It is especially implausible that §1252(d)(1) treats reconsideration and reopening as “available … as of right” just because the discretion whether to grant them is not specified by statute. As we noted previously, when Congress enacted §1252(d)(1), regulation and historical practice had already firmly established Board reconsideration and reopening as discretionary. ; 8 CFR §3.2 (1996); Dada, 554 U. S., at 12–13. We have no reason to think §1252(d)(1) categorizes those well-understood discretionary forms of review as “available … as of right.”

The Government also posits that reconsideration and reopening are “available … as of right” because in certain cases, denying the noncitizen’s motion would be reversible as an abuse of discretion. See Brief for Respondent 41, n. 11; Tr. of Oral Arg. 39. All this shows is that the agency’s discretion has limits. That is no surprise. “Traditionally, … decisions on matters of discretion are reviewable for abuse of discretion.” Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 572 U. S. 559, 563 (2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). They remain “matters of discretion” all the same.