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Rh sources of jurisdiction outside §1252 does not tell us which provisions within §1252 are essential jurisdictional prerequisites. And even if some provisions in a statutory section qualify as jurisdictional, that does not suffice to establish that all others are. Sebelius, 568 U. S., at 155; Gonzalez, 565 U. S., at 146–147. This argument, like the Government’s others, fails to demonstrate that it is “clea[r]” that Congress made §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement jurisdictional. Arbaugh, 546 U. S., at 515.

Because §1252(d)(1)’s exhaustion requirement is not jurisdictional, it is subject to waiver and forfeiture. See Nutraceutical Corp. v. Lambert, 586 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2019) (slip op., at 3–4). The Court of Appeals erred in holding otherwise.

The Government now suggests that even if §1252(d)(1) is not jurisdictional, the Court of Appeals’ sua sponte requirement that Santos-Zacaria comply with §1252(d)(1) can be justified on alternative grounds. Brief for Respondent 26, n. 7. We do not reach that issue. Instead, we hold that, even if §1252(d)(1) were applied here, Santos-Zacaria has done enough to satisfy it. That is, §1252(d)(1) does not require that Santos-Zacaria seek reconsideration from the Board, as the Court of Appeals believed.

Under the plain language of §1252(d)(1), a noncitizen