Page:Santos-Zacaria v. Garland.pdf/10

Rh same time—and even in the same section—as §1252(d)(1). But Congress eschewed such plainly jurisdictional language in §1252(d)(1).

The contrast between the text of §1252(d)(1) and the “unambiguous jurisdictional terms” in related provisions “show[s] that Congress would have spoken in clearer terms if it intended” for §1252(d)(1) “to have similar jurisdictional force.” Gonzalez v. Thaler, 565 U. S. 134, 143 (2012); accord, Henderson, 562 U. S., at 438–439. And, here, there is good reason to infer that the linguistic contrast between §1252(d)(1) and neighboring provisions is meaningful, not haphazard: Unlike other provisions, §1252(d)(1) concerns exhaustion, and its language tracks exhaustion’s usual nonjurisdictional status.

Taken together, these two features of §1252(d)(1)—its content as an exhaustion requirement and its contrast with related, plainly jurisdictional provisions—make interpreting §1252(d)(1) as a claim-processing rule credible enough that we cannot deem it clearly jurisdictional. Thus, we conclude that §1252(d)(1) is a non-jurisdictional rule “ ‘merely prescrib[ing] the method by which the jurisdiction granted the courts by Congress is to be exercised.’ ” Kontrick, 540 U. S., at 454 (quoting 12 C. Wright, A. Miller, & R. Marcus, Federal Practice and Procedure §3141, p. 485 (2d ed. 1997)).

The Government offers several reasons why §1252(d)(1) should nonetheless be characterized as jurisdictional. Given our clear-statement rule, none is persuasive.