Page:Samia v. United States.pdf/8

4 was with pulled the trigger on that woman in a van that he and Mr. Stillwell was driving.” App. 76 (emphasis added). Other portions of Stouch’s testimony also used the “other person” descriptor to refer to someone with whom Stillwell had traveled and lived and who carried a particular firearm. During Stouch’s testimony, the District Court instructed the jury that his testimony was admissible only as to Stillwell and should not be considered as to Samia or Hunter. The District Court later provided a similar limiting instruction before the jury began its deliberations.

The jury convicted Samia and his codefendants on all counts, and the District Court subsequently denied Samia’s post-trial motions. The District Court then sentenced Samia to life plus 10 years’ imprisonment.

Samia appealed to the Second Circuit. On appeal, and as relevant here, he argued that the admission of Stillwell’s confession—even as altered and with a limiting instruction—was constitutional error because other evidence and statements at trial enabled the jury to immediately infer that the “other person” described in the confession was Samia himself. He noted that, during opening statements, the Government had asserted that Stillwell drove the van while Samia “was in the passenger seat,” and that Samia pulled out a gun, “turned around, aimed carefully and shot [Lee].” Id., at 52. He also pointed out that the Government had stated that “Stillwell admitted to driving the car while the man he was with turned around and shot [Lee].” Id., at 58. So, even though Samia’s position in the van and shooting of Lee were relevant to the Government’s theory of the case with or without Stillwell’s confession, Samia argued that those statements would allow the jury to infer that he was the “other person” in Stillwell’s confession.

Samia made the same argument with respect to several pieces of trial evidence. For example, he pointed out that