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, dissenting.

I join ’s dissent in full, and agree, in particular, with her insight that the majority’s bottom-line view is that “Bruton should go.” I am writing to emphasize that most of the force of the Court’s argument (to the extent that it is at all forceful) comes from the majority having improperly reframed the constitutional standard that applies to the admission of incriminating testimonial statements of a codefendant during a joint criminal trial.

Under the majority’s approach, the default rule is that a nontestifying codefendant’s incriminating confession is admissible, so long as it is accompanied by a limiting instruction. ,, . Thus, for present purposes, the majority repeatedly calls Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968), a “ ‘narrow exception’ ” to this default rule. ,, . And the thrust of the majority’s holding is that the so-called Bruton exception is—and must be—narrow: Bruton is a pesky deviation that requires the exclusion of otherwise admissible evidence (hence, the ease with which the majority contemplates dispensing with that precedent).

That approach inverts the constitutional principles that govern this case. Under our well-established Sixth Amendment precedents, the Court’s analysis must, instead, start