Page:Samia v. United States.pdf/33

Rh Courts have long considered those basic factors when applying Bruton. And the Government has proved unable to cite a single case—including in Circuits applying Bruton to confessions like Stillwell’s—in which doing so created “administrability” issues, much less “fewer joint trials.” Tr. of Oral Arg. 93–96. In any event, greater “convenience in the administration of the law,” as Bruton noted, cannot come at the expense “of fundamental principles of constitutional liberty.” 391 U. S., at 135. “That price,” we recognized then, “is too high.” Ibid.

With nothing else to support it, the majority reaches for two props inconsistent with Bruton itself. One is the “presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions.” The majority correctly describes that presumption; it just forgets that the presumption does not apply when the evidence at issue is an accusatory co-defendant confession. Bruton could not have been clearer on the point: “[W]e cannot accept limiting instructions as an adequate substitute for [a defendant’s] constitutional right of cross-examination.” 391 U. S., at 137; see Gray, 523 U. S., at 192 (stating that co-defendant confessions are “so prejudicial that limiting instructions cannot work”); Richardson, 481 U. S., at 208 (noting “the overwhelming probability of [jurors’] inability” to follow instructions to disregard co-defendant confessions); see. And the majority does no better in invoking “historical evidentiary practice.” See. One point here is ’s: There just isn’t much