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14 for the blank.” Id., at 193. It also reasoned that “statements redacted to leave a blank or some other similarly obvious alteration” were “directly accusatory,” “point[ing] directly to the defendant … in a manner similar to Evans’ use of Bruton’s name or to a testifying codefendant’s accusatory finger.” Id., at 194.

While the Court “concede[d] that Richardson placed outside the scope of Bruton’s rule those statements that incriminate inferentially,” it explained that “inference pure and simple cannot make the critical difference, for if it did, then Richardson would also place outside Bruton’s scope confessions that use shortened first names, nicknames, [and] descriptions as unique as the ‘red-haired, bearded, one-eyed man-with-a-limp.’ ” Id., at 195. The Court elaborated: "“That being so, Richardson must depend in significant part upon the kind of, not the simple fact of, inference. Richardson’s inferences involved statements that did not refer directly to the defendant himself and which became incriminating ‘only when linked with evidence introduced later at trial.’ 481 U. S., at 208. The inferences at issue here involve statements that, despite redaction, obviously refer directly to someone, often obviously the defendant, and which involve inferences that a jury ordinarily could make immediately, even were the confession the very first item introduced at trial.” Id., at 196."

Finally, the Court stressed that its holding, which addressed only obviously redacted confessions, was sufficiently narrow to avoid “unnecessarily lead[ing] prosecutors to abandon the [relevant] confession or joint trial.” Id., at 197.

Viewed together, the Court’s precedents distinguish between confessions that directly implicate a defendant and