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Rh Of particular relevance here, the presumption that jurors follow limiting instructions applies to statements that are often substantially more credible and inculpatory than a codefendant’s confession. For example, this Court has held that statements elicited from a defendant in violation of Miranda can be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility, provided the jury is properly instructed not to consider them as evidence of guilt. Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222, 223–225 (1971). Such statements, elicited from the defendant himself, are often some of the most compelling evidence of guilt available to a jury. By contrast, jurors may cast a critical eye on accomplice testimony—and, in particular, self-serving accomplice testimony like Stillwell’s that accuses another of the most culpable conduct.

The presumption credits jurors by refusing to assume that they are either “too ignorant to comprehend, or were too unmindful of their duty to respect, instructions” of the court. Pennsylvania Co. v. Roy, 102 U. S. 451, 459 (1880). Moreover, to disregard or to make unnecessary exceptions to it “would make inroads into th[e] entire complex code of … criminal evidentiary law, and would threaten other large areas of trial jurisprudence.” Spencer v. Texas, 385 U. S. 554, 562 (1967). As explained below, we have no reason to do so here.

In Bruton v. United States, this Court “recognized a narrow exception to” the presumption that juries follow their instructions, holding “that a defendant is deprived of his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation when the facially incriminating confession of a nontestifying codefendant is introduced at their joint trial,” even with a proper instruction. Richardson, 481 U. S., at 207. In Richardson v. Marsh, the Court “decline[d] to extend [Bruton] further” to “confessions that do not name the defendant.” Id., at 211. Gray v. Maryland, 523 U. S. 185, 194 (1998), later qualified