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Rh that apply to the interpretation of the relevant statutory provisions. Bond, 572 U. S., at 857. Under those presumptions, the EPA must provide clear evidence that it is authorized to regulate in the manner it proposes.

First, this Court “require[s] Congress to enact exceedingly clear language if it wishes to significantly alter the balance between federal and state power and the power of the Government over private property.” United States Forest Service v. Cowpasture River Preservation Assn., 590 U. S. ___, ___–___ (2020) (slip op., at 15–16); see also Bond, 572 U. S., at 858. Regulation of land and water use lies at the core of traditional state authority. See, e.g., SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 174 (citing Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corporation, 513 U. S. 30, 44 (1994)); Tarrant Regional Water Dist. v. Herrmann, 569 U. S. 614, 631 (2013). An overly broad interpretation of the CWA’s reach would impinge on this authority. The area covered by wetlands alone is vast—greater than the combined surface area of California and Texas. And the scope of the EPA’s conception of “the waters of the United States” is truly staggering when this vast territory is supplemented by all the additional area, some of which is generally dry, over which the Agency asserts jurisdiction. Particularly given the CWA’s express policy to “preserve” the States’ “primary” authority over land and water use, §1251(b), this Court has required a clear statement from Congress when determining the scope of “the waters of the United States.” SWANCC, 531 U. S., at 174; accord, Rapanos, 547 U. S., at 738 (plurality opinion).

The EPA, however, offers only a passing attempt to square its interpretation with the text of §1362(7), and its “significant nexus” theory is particularly implausible. It suggests that the meaning of “the waters of the United