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Rh sought to minimize SWANCC’s impact. They took the view that this Court’s holding was “strictly limited to waters that are ‘nonnavigable, isolated, and intrastate’ ” and that “field staff should continue to exercise CWA jurisdiction to the full extent of their authority” for “any waters that fall outside of that category.” The agencies never defined exactly what they regarded as the “full extent of their authority.” They instead encouraged local field agents to make decisions on a case-by-case basis.

What emerged was a system of “vague” rules that depended on “locally developed practices.” GAO Report 26. Deferring to the agencies’ localized decisions, lower courts blessed an array of expansive interpretations of the CWA’s reach. See, e.g., United States v. Deaton, 332 F. 3d 698, 702 (CA4 2003) (holding that a property owner violated the CWA by piling soil near a ditch 32 miles from navigable waters). Within a few years, the agencies had “interpreted their jurisdiction over ‘the waters of the United States’ to cover 270-to-300 million acres” of wetlands and “virtually any parcel of land containing a channel or conduit … through which rainwater or drainage may occasionally or intermittently flow.” Rapanos v. United States, 547 U. S. 715, 722 (2006) (plurality opinion).

It was against this backdrop that we granted review in Rapanos v. United States. The lower court in the principal case before us had held that the CWA covered wetlands near ditches and drains that eventually emptied into navigable waters at least 11 miles away, a theory that had supported the petitioner’s conviction in a related prosecution. Id., at 720, 729. Although we vacated that decision, no position commanded a majority of the Court. Four Justices concluded that the CWA’s coverage did not extend beyond two categories: first, certain relatively permanent bodies of