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 I have no doubt that even on a court composed of members of the genus Hercules and Athena there would in many cases be differences of opinion, incapable of rational elucidation, on whether to impose the death penalty in a particular case, where its imposition was, as in the case of section 277(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act, dependant on the application of widely formulated criteria and the exercise of difficult value judgments.

The conclusion which I reach is that the imposition of the death penalty is inevitably arbitrary and unequal. Whatever the scope of the right to life in section 9 of the Constitution may be, it unquestionably encompasses the right not to be deliberately put to death by the state in a way which is arbitrary and unequal. I would therefore hold that section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act is inconsistent with the section 9 right to life. I would moreover also hold that it is inconsistent with section 11(2). Where the arbitrary and unequal infliction of punishment occurs at the level of a punishment so unique as the death penalty, it strikes me as being cruel and inhuman. For one person to receive the death sentence, where a similarly placed person does not, is, in my assessment of values, cruel to the person receiving it. To allow chance, in this way, to determine the life or death of a person, is to reduce the person to a cypher in a sophisticated judicial lottery. This is to treat the sentenced person as inhuman. When these considerations are taken in conjunction with those set forth by the President in his judgment, they render the death penalty a cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment. For the reasons expounded by the President in his judgment, and with which I fully agree, neither the infringement of section 9 nor of section 11(2) by section 277(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act, can be saved by the provisions of section 33(1) of the Constitution. Accordingly the provisions of section 277(1)(a) must be held to be inconsistent with sections 9 and 11(2) of the Constitution.

In paragraphs [132] to [134]  of his judgment the President alludes to the provision in section 33(1)(b) of the Constitution that a limitation "shall not negate the essential content of the right in question" but, after referring to uncertainties concerning its meaning, finds it unnecessary to resolve the issue in the present case. In paragraph [133] he postulates, however, a subjective and an objective approach to the problem. I do not necessarily agree with his formulation of the objective approach. In my view it is unnecessary in the present case to say anything at all about the meaning to be attached to this provision. It is one which the framers of our Constitution borrowed in part from article 19(2) of the [[Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany|German Basic Law ("Grundgesetz") which provides that—

"In keinem Falle darf ein Grundrecht in seinem Wesensgehalt angetastet werden"

("In no case may the essence of a basic right be encroached upon" )

There are obvious differences in the wording of the qualification. Nevertheless there is a wealth of German case law and scholarship on the topic Decisions of the Federal Constitutional Court : 2 BVerfGE 266 at 285; 6 BVerfGE 32 at 41; 7 BVerfGE 377 at 411; 13 BVerfGE 97 at 122; 15 BVerfGE 126 at 144; 16 BVerfGE 194 at 201; 21 BVerfGE 92 at 93; 22 BVerfGE 180 at 218; 27 BVerfGE 344 at 350; 30 BVerfGE 1 at 24; 30 BVerfGE 47 at 53; 31 BVerfGE 58 at 61; 32 BVerfGE 373 at 379; 34 BVerfGE 238 at 245; 58 BVerfGE 300 at 348; 61 BVerfGE 82 at 113; 80 BVerfGE 367 at 373.

Decisions of the Federal Administrative Court : 1 BVerwGE 92 at 93; 1 BVerwGE 269 at 270; 2 BVerwGE 85 at 87; BVerwGE reported in 90 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt at 709.

Decisions of the Federal Court of Justice : 4 BGHSt 375 at 377 (also reported in 1955 Die Öffentliche Verwaltung at 176); 4 BGHSt 385; 5 BGHSt 375; 6 BGHZ 270 at 275; 22 BGHZ 168 at 176.

General academic works : Von Münch/Kunig Grundgesetz Kommentar (1992) 997–1004; Leibholz-Rinck-Hesselberger Grundgesetz Kommentar an Hand der Rechtsprechung des Bundesverfassungsgerichts (1994) (commentary on art.19) 16–18; Maunz-Dürig-Herzog Grundgesetz Kommentar (1991) (commentary on art.19II) 1–14; Jarass/Pieroth Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1992) 336–8; J Isensee & P Kirchhof (eds) Handbuch des Staatsrechts vol 5 (1992) 795; E Denninger in Reihe Alternativkommentare Kommentar zum Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1984) 1179; Schmidt-Bleibtreu-Klein Kommentar zum Grundgesetz (1990) 397-9; K Hesse Grundzüge des Verfassungsrechts der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (1991) 140; Von Mangoldt/Klein Das Bonner Grundgesetz (1966) 551; K Doehring Allgemeine Staatslehre (1991) 222; Maunz-Zippelius Deutsches Staatsrecht (1991) 161.

Specialist literature on art.19(2) GG : P Häberle Die Wesensgehaltgarantie des Artikels 19 Abs. 2 Grundgesetz (1983); E von Hippel Grenzen und Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte (1965); H Krüger 'Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte des Art.19 GG' (1955) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 597; L Scheider Der Schutz des Wesensgehalts von Grundrechten nach Art.19 Abs.2 GG (1983); G Herbert 'Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte' 12 (1985) Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift 321; Zivier Der Wesensgehalt der Grundrechte Diss. Berlin (1960); J Chlosta Der Wesensgehalt der Eigentumsgewährleistung (1975); P Lerche Übermass und Verfassungsrecht (1961); Kaufmann 'Über den 'Wesensgehalt' der Grund- und Menschenrechte' (1984) Archiv für Rechts- und Sozialphilosophie 384; E Denninger 'Zum Begriff des 'Wesensgehaltes' in der Rechtsprechung (Art.19.Abs.II GG)' (1960) Die Öffentliche Verwaltung 812. . Without the fullest exposition of, and argument on,