Page:Russell Bucklew v. Anne L. Precythe, Director, Missouri Department of Corrections.pdf/59

Rh degree.” Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U. S. 280, 303–304 (1976). For that reason, the equities in a death penalty case will almost always favor the prisoner so long as he or she can show a reasonable probability of success on the merits. See Nken, 556 U. S., at 434 (noting that success on the merits and irreparable injury “are the most critical” factors); cf. Glossip, 576 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11) (observing, in a preliminary-injunction posture, that “[t]he parties agree that this case turns on whether petitioners are able to establish a likelihood of success on the merits” and analyzing the case accordingly); accord, id., at ___ (, dissenting) (slip op., at 22). This accords with each court’s “‘duty to search for constitutional error with painstaking care’” in capital cases. Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U. S. 419, 422 (1995).

It is of course true that a court may deny relief when a party has “unnecessarily” delayed seeking it, Nelson v. Campbell, 541 U. S. 637, 649–650 (2004), and that courts should not grant equitable relief on clearly “‘dilatory,’” “‘speculative,’” or meritless grounds, ante, at 31 (quoting Hill v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 573, 584–585 (2006)); see also Gomez v. United States Dist. Court for Northern Dist. of Cal., 503 U. S. 653, 654 (1992) (per curiam) (vacating a stay where an inmate’s unjustified 10-year delay in bringing a claim was an “obvious attempt at manipulation”). That is hardly the same thing as treating late-arising claims as presumptively suspect.