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 June 9th. Of 62 ships "of the first class," 59, averaging 726 tons and 26 guns, were still with the fleet.

Captain Duro, and Professor Laughton following him, seem to be of opinion that, upon the whole, the Spanish vessels were much more lightly armed than their enemies. Dr. W. F. Tilton is somewhat opposed to this conclusion. Of the guns, Professor Laughton says: "As a rule they were small — four, six, or nine pounders: they were comparatively few, and they were very badly worked." Dr. Tilton imagines that he can trace the origin of this assertion to the fact that, on July 26th, the day after the fight off the Isle of Wight, Medina Sidonia sent to Parma a request for shot of four, six, and ten pounds. A list, dated May 4th, shows that the Spanish fleet had 1497 bronze guns of all calibres, including many "cannon," i.e., ships' guns of the largest size then employed. Besides them there were 934 iron pieces of all sorts. "For these 2431 weapons," says Dr. Tilton, "there were only 123,790 shot supplied — an average of about 50 shot per gun. It is almost certain that for the lighter pieces the supply was larger than for the greater; but, supposing that the allowance was the same for all, the quicker running short of the small shot becomes only the more natural"; and Medina Sidonia's request ought not to be tortured into an implication that he had very few guns bigger than nine or ten-pounders. Dr. Tilton, moreover, points out that Professor Laughton bases at least part of his conclusions upon a statement of force drawn up on July 9th (N.S.), 1587, and that he appears to ignore that, as late as March 4th, 1588, Philip ordered the armament of the Armada to be strengthened.

It is, however, probable that the thirty-four ships of the English Royal Navy, which were engaged, had a slight superiority of armament over any thirty-four vessels belonging to the Armada; and it is quite certain, not only that the Spanish gunnery was very inferior, but also that the Spanish practice of making portholes so small as barely to admit the muzzles of the guns mounted behind them, prevented many guns, which might otherwise have rendered excellent service, from being effectively employed. On the other hand,