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 in the neighbourhood, then it would be the duty of Medina Sidonia with part, or the whole, of the Armada, to convoy Parma. This interpretation is the more probable, seeing that Philip, in his instructions, ordered his admiral, after Parma's landing, to guard and keep open the passage between Flanders and the mouth of the Thames.

At first sight, it seems illogical to protect Parma's passage from Flanders from a base at the mouth of the Thames. But it must be remembered that on the coast of Flanders there were no ports suitable for the Armada, whereas at the mouth of the Thames, and in the Downs, there were good anchorages, where storms might be ridden out, and where favourable opportunities might be awaited.

Medina Sidonia's business, then, was to ensure Parma's passage to Margate; to there reinforce his army with, in the most favourable event, six thousand men; and thenceforward to co-operate with him in the mouth of the Thames. The admiral's mission was subsidiary to that of Parma, but might nevertheless be a very important and honourable one, especially in the case of a great action being fought at sea. It is clear that Philip entirely failed to comprehend the only principles in accordance with which successful invasions of insular States with respectable navies can be carried out. Had he understood them, he must have ordered the projected invasion to wait upon the fighting of a decisive action with the English fleet, instead of exhorting his admiral to avoid a battle. We may, therefore, take it that his characterisation of an action at sea as "after all, the chief thing," was mere consolatory flattery, designed to compensate Medina Sidonia, in some measure, for having been vouchsafed no more than what was intended to be a secondary part in the drama.

The secret instructions confirm the supposition that, after Medina Sidonia's arrival off Margate, Parma was to pass over with his fighting force. But if, they continue, God should fail to permit the hoped-for issue and should prevent Parma from crossing, thus rendering impracticable the desired co-operation, then, still remaining in correspondence with Parma, the admiral should endeavour to make himself master of the Isle of Wight. This would give the Spaniards a secure harbour whence they might pursue the various