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 The objects of the Armada were effectually frustrated; but when the immediate danger was overpast, thinking minds began to ask themselves whether, after all, the general policy of national defence would not be furthered rather by attacking the enemy in his own waters, than by merely checking his attacks upon England. The victory over the Armada had been won in English waters, and within sight of the English shores. Should the struggle have been fought out there? Ought it not to have been fought out in Spanish waters, seeing that Queen Elizabeth claimed to be sovereign of the Narrow Seas, and that, granting her claim, her realm had been actually invaded, and that the invasion had been repelled only after it had insulted her territory?

These and similar considerations led to the adoption of a more active policy. The moral value attaching to a vigorously offensive defence obtained recognition; and, while Cumberland, to whom the queen lent the Golden Lion for the purpose, was commissioned to undertake a privateering venture to the South Seas, it was determined to vigorously attack Spain at home, ere she should have time to organise a new offensive expedition.

Philip, as has been seen, had added Portugal to his dominions. The popular candidate for the throne of that country, Dom Antonio, was a refugee in England, and believed that, with a little naval assistance, he could gain a crown. Moreover, Portugal had been the scene of the fitting out of one Armada, and might be the scene of the fitting out of a second, Lisbon being the most convenient Atlantic port in Spanish hands. For more than one reason, therefore, Portugal seemed to be the best point at which to strike.

An expedition was accordingly fitted out in 1589, partly at the queen's expense, but chiefly at the charges of private individuals, among whom Sir Francis Drake and Sir John Norreys, with their immediate friends, were the most conspicuous. The States of Holland also co-operated. Some pieces of artillery for land service, a number of horses, several Dutch ships, and a considerable body of men either failed to join the fleet ere it sailed, or failed to get across the Bay of Biscay; so that the expedition was in many respects ill-found, and inadequate for the work in hand. It put to