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 him to study history, nor, during his active career, does he usually enjoy many opportunities for reading, still less for original research. The executive officer, therefore, who can ultimately, like Nicolas or Colomb in the British, or like Mahan in the United States Navy, free himself from the grooves of his professional vocation, and attain distinction in the new walk of life, must be a man of exceptional qualifications, and must always be a rara avis.

The civilian writers on British naval history have been more numerous. They include, among many — and I name only those of some eminence — Josiah Burchett, who succeeded Pepys as Secretary of the Admiralty, Samuel Colliber, John Lediard, Dr. John Campbell (and his continuators), Sir S. Berkeley, Hervey, Dr. Entick, Dr. Robert Beatson, John Charnock, Charles Derrick, William James, Southey, and others, down to Mr. M. Oppenheim, besides biographers like O'Byrne and Fox Bourne.

As a critical naval historian, we have, I am afraid, no Englishman, either naval or civil, who approaches in accuracy, lucidity, and charm of style Captain A. T. Mahan, of the United States Navy. Another American naval historian who, however, is a civilian, has, it seems to me, shown a measure of intentional honesty and fairness which, unhappily, does not always characterise those British writers who have dealt with the same subject. I mean Mr. Theodore Roosevelt, the writer of the history of the war of 1812.

But it is not my intention to introduce here a naval bibliography, nor, if it were my wish to do so, would space suffice. I thus briefly summarise some little of the historical work that has been done in connection with the Royal Navy, merely in order to lead up to a statement of the chief considerations which have induced me to undertake the present book, and which have influenced me in elaborating its scheme, and in seeking assistance from others in carrying it out.

Having carefully surveyed what has been done, and having examined into the causes of failure, where failure or comparative failure has resulted, and into the causes of success, where success has been conspicuous, I have had certain convictions forced upon me. One is that a general naval history framed upon the scale of Nicolas's, is too huge for practical use. People will not now-a-days purchase a book in twenty volumes. Still less will they read it. Yet a general naval history, dealing with all the aspects of the