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 flotilla necessary to proceed up the Irrawaddy, or even to man it with rowers if one had been equipped. The same circumstance, and the desolate state of the country, from which nothing in the shape of supplies was to be procured, rendered it equally certain, that both for the temporary occupation of Rangoon, and the eventual march into the interior, the force was entirely dependent upon the presidencies of Bengal and Madras, for every description of conveyance and food: a state of things which was little to have been expected, from the known commerce and supposed resources of Rangoon, and for which, accordingly, no previous preparation had been made. “Every act of the enemy,” says Sir Archibald Campbell, in a despatch dated June 1, 1824, “evinces a most marked determination of carrying hostility to the very last extremity; approaching our posts day and night, under cover of an impervious and uncombustible jungle, constructing stockades and redoubts on every road and pathway, even within musket-shot of our sentries; and, from their hidden fastnesses, carrying on a most barbarous and harassing warfare; firing upon our sentries at all hours of the night, and lurking on the outskirts of the jungle, for the purpose of carrying off any unlucky wretch whom chance may throw in their way .”

On the 2d June, Sir Archibald Campbell received information, that the enemy had assembled in great force, and were stockading themselves at Kemmendine, intending to attack the British lines. He therefore ordered two strong columns of reconnoissance from the Madras division, to move, on the morning of the 3d June, upon two roads leading from the Shwe-da-gon pagoda to the above village, and proceeded 