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790 such a distance that the guns on shore could give them no protection ill case of an attack. From the best information I have been able to procure, there are not more than 1000 land troops on the island, and not more than 600 of them fit to serve.

“From the local knowledge I have of this island, and all the information that I have succeeded in obtaining, I have no doubt of its accuracy; and in the event of an expedition being undertaken against it, if you will permit me to have the honor of laying the Prince of Wales alongside the Spanish Admiral, and to pilot in your squadron, I will answer for the success of the enterprise with my life.

“''Rear-Admiral H. Harvey, &c. &c. Jan''. 13, 1797.”

A few days after the date of the above report, Captain Wood was desired by Rear Admiral Harvey to turn his attention to the mode of attack necessary to be adopted; in consequence of which, he submitted to that officer and Sir Ralph Abercrombie the following plan, which after due consideration they did him the honor to approve of, and signified their determination to carry into execution:

“Secrecy, and the utmost expedition, are most earnestly recommended. “The squadron, with the transports and troops, ought to assemble at the island of Cariaco. It would be proper to leave that island by three o’clock in the afternoon, that the transports and heavy sailing ships might have time to clear the small islands and keys to the southward of it before dark.

The squadron might then proceed under easy sail on a S.E.b.S. course, so as to arrive well to windward on the north side of Trinidad by two or three o’clock in the afternoon of next day.

“The squadron might then proceed as far to the westward as Sus Manos, or Punta Chupara, the northernmost point of the island, where it might be proper to detach a company of light troops to take possession of the bay and road of Les Quebas, the only road that communicates between the plantations on the north side of the island and the town of Port d’Espagne; this would effectually prevent the enemy having any knowledge of our arrival; or if thought necessary, a larger body of troops might be landed to take the enemy in the rear, to prevent the men landing from the ships, or to cut off their communication with the country.

“To prevent any alarm, the squadron should keep the coast close on board, (as there is no danger that does not appear, and good anchorage every where along the shore) and under such sail as to arrive at the Bocas about nine o’clock in the evening. An attentive observer always knows by