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562 Annunciato, which was protected on the sea-side by ten gun-boats and two mortar-boats I had written to the Count de Thurn for three gallies, which were then not much wanted at Procida; but, instead of their coming, I only received excuses about the weather (which, no doubt, was at one time threatening, but it afterwards cleared up); this caused me to write a positive order, and the gallies were sent; but the Count de Thurn, at the same time, informed me, that his instructions were quite independent of my orders, and that he could not receive any but from his Sovereign, or those who were his superiors. Reference may be had to my letters on this subject, but I do not wish it to be renewed, as I am on very good terms with the Count de Thurn, and am perfectly satisfied that the evil originated in his having secret orders – which, if I had not acted cautiously, might, in consequence of those left with me, have been attended with very fatal consequences. On the evening of the 13th, the Cardinal (or rather the Russians) took the fort of Villema, and the bridge of Mudalena. Carracioli’s gun-boats annoyed them a good deal, the weather preventing my approaching sufficiently close with the frigates; but if the gallies had been with me, I should certainly have taken some of the gun-boats, or caused them to retreat. On the 14th the weather was bad; and it was not until the 15th, the day the gallies joined me, that I could venture so deep into the bay as the castles of Revigliano, and Castel-à-Mare, which capitulated on terms mentioned in my letter book [The garrison of Revigliano surrendered as prisoners of war, Captain Foote promising to intercede with his Sicilian Majesty in their behalf. The terms granted to Castel-à-Mare were, that the garrison and men belonging to the flotilla, should march out of the fort with military honors, and ground their arms on passing the last barrier; such of them as chose to avail themselves of the protection of the British flag, to be received on board the Seahorse, the remainder to dispose of themselves as they might think proper. See “Captain Foote’s Vindication,” p. 105 to 111.], which circumstance I considered of the utmost consequence – for if their garrisons, or friends, amounting to about 1000 men, had availed themselves of the opportunity, to concert with the republicans at Annunciato, and make an attack on the rear of the Cardinal’s army, his enterprise must inevitably have failed.

“On the 17th I informed the Cardinal, that I should immediately join the gun-boats and mortar-boats [Among this number were those given up at Castel-à-Mare.] at the Piedi Grotta, with a view of attacking Castel Uovo; and on the 18th, I sent Captain Oswald, of the Perseus, with a letter to the Commandant of that Fort, in the hope of its opening the way to a negotiation. On the night of the 17th, I had sent an officer to the Cardinal, who told him that the rebels, and the French, particularly the latter, had refused to capitulate to an Ecclesiastic; that his means were scarce sufficient to reduce determined and obstinate people; and that he wished me to try what I could do, by offering to hearken to the terms; they might have to propose. I received a very insolent verbal answer from 