Page:Rousseau - Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar, 1889.djvu/58

 None of his spontaneous actions, therefore, enter into the general system of Providence, nor can be imputed to it. Providence does not contrive the evil, which is the consequence of man's abusing the liberty his creator gave him; it only does not prevent it, either because the evil, which so impotent a being is capable of doing, is beneath its notice, or because it cannot prevent it without laying a restraint upon his liberty, and causing a greater evil by debasing his nature. Providence has left man at liberty, not that he should do evil, but good, by choice. It has capacitated him to make such choice, in making a proper use of the faculties it has bestowed on him. His powers, however, are at the same time so limited and confined, that the use he makes of his liberty is not of importance enough to disturb the general order of the universe. The evil done by man falls upon his own head, without making any change in the system of the world,—without hindering the human species from being preserved in spite of themselves. To complain, therefore, that God does not prevent man from doing evil is, in fact, to complain that he has given a superior excellence to human nature,—that he has ennobled our actions by annexing to them the merit of virtue.

The highest enjoyment is that of being contented with ourselves. It is in order to deserve this contentment that we are placed here on earth and endowed with liberty,—that we are tempted by our passions, and restrained by conscience. What could Omnipotence itself do more in our favor? Could it have established a contradiction in our nature, or have allotted a reward for well-doing to a being incapable