Page:Robert M. Kennedy - German Antiguerrilla Operations in the Balkans (1941-1944) - CMH Pub 104-18 (1954).pdf/66

GERMAN ANTIGUERRILLA OPERATIONS IN THE BALKANS (1941–1944) attitude of the corps commander and his staff, who despaired of holding the Thracian coast against a determined Anglo-American landing in force. Rather, the Bulgarians preferred to build a defense line along the Rhodope Mountains, just inside their own country. Believing an invasion would be preceded by a large-scale airborne landing to their rear, they feared the cutting of communications with the Bulgarian zone of the interior.

Respecting the Bulgarians as hardy and willing soldiers, the Germans pointed out that the Bulgarian lack of experience in modern military operations had caused them to overestimate the Allies, and that a strong coastal defense organization would discourage any landing in an area so exposed to a German flank attack from the Greek peninsula. The Bulgarians, temporarily reassured, expanded their construction of coastal defenses and agreed to send a number of their commanders and staff officers to observe German operations in Italy.

The German units, bearing the brunt of the antiguerrilla effort, had difficulties of their own, chief among them a shortage of personnel. To supplement the trickle of replacements, General Loehr directed all service organizations to make their able-bodied men available for transfer to combat units. The commander of Army Group E also had to overcome some lethargy on the part of subordinate headquarters, and on one occasion sent a sternly worded directive ordering the abolishment of such terms as "Sunday duty" from the staff duty rosters of the corps and area commands.

A number of operations were undertaken by units of Army Group E during the opening months of 1944 in an attempt to clear guerrilla-infested areas of Greece. Though not on the large scale of operations in Yugoslavia to the north, they nonetheless diverted thousands of troops from the preparation of coastal defenses and transfer to other theaters of war. In addition, they involved extensive use of vehicles and an expenditure of gasoline the Germans could ill afford.

The first operation of significance, in the Salonika-Aegean area, was called WOLF; both German and Bulgarian troops participated. A total of 254 enemy dead was counted, and over 400 prisoners taken. Operation HORRIDO followed, with units of the XXII Mountain Corps participating. Guerrilla casualties totalled 310 dead and 15 captured, while the German troops suffered 18 dead, wounded, and missing.

During this period the economic situation worsened steadily, with the value of the Greek drachma reduced to a point where it required 500,000 to purchase a pound of butter on the widespread black market. As a result, large numbers of Greeks fled to join the guerrillas, particularly the communist group. General Loehr, for this reason, found it