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years, and who shall have been a citizen of this state six months next preceding the election, shall be deemed a qualified voter in the county or district in which he actually resides, and no person having these qualifications can be deprived of the exercise of the elective franchise by mere legislative enactment, while the constitution remains unaltered. Indeed the right of those having the constitutional qualifications to vote, is founded in the fundamental law of the land, and cannot be legislated away. The right of suffrage in this state, if not an inherent, is at least a constitutional right, and whoever possesses the required qualification, cannot be restrained from the exercise of that right except by the alteration of the constitution, and any law infringing upon that right as vested by the constitution is null and void.

Then the inquiry is, has the 6th section of the act above copied the effect to abridge the right of suffrage conferred by the constitution—does that law require other and different qualifications than those required by the constitution—in short, is the law repugnant to the constitution? The answer to these inquiries will be arrived at by an examination of the law in question.

The sixth section of the act under consideration has a two-fold operation: one prospective; and the other retrospective.

That part of the law which requires the voter, before depositing his vote, to swear that he will support the constitution of the United States, and of this state, is prospective in its operation, and looks to the future conduct of the voter, and requires nothing more of him than by law he is bound to do. This part of the law does not look into his past history, or scrutinize his antecedents. It does not demand that he shall purge himself of treason against the United States or this state. It does not have the effect to restrict the right to vote as conferred by the constitution, nor does it add to the qualifications required by the constitution; and is therefore free from the objection of unconstitutionality, and is as we conceive, thus far a valid law. Bank of Hamilton vs. Dudley, 2 Pet., 526; 2 Blacks., 8.

But, how is it with the residue of the oath required? That