Page:Riddles of the Sphinx (1891).djvu/10

 intended rather for the deniers and doubters of religious truth. And this was all the more possible that on the whole the discussion dealt with subjects upon which religious tradition was silent, or discussed them on planes so different that their respective assertions could hardly come into contact. Nevertheless, whenever the conclusions arrived at coincided with those of religion, this has been frankly admitted. But in no case has this coincidence been quoted as an authority, or taken the place of independent argument. Neither, on the other hand, has the author concealed his disagreement with certain widely prevalent religious views, such as, e.g., that as to the infinity of the Deity. But he has been at pains to point out that the views he combats have not been unambiguously asserted by the Christian Church, and that they are incompatible with the spirit of all religion. He trusts, therefore, that rather than impugn the orthodoxy of a philosophy which contains no doctrine inconsistent with the principles of religion, theologians will find it possible to put such an interpretation upon the dogmas in question as will at length reconcile faith with reason.

Instead of hastily condemning verbal divergencies from the wording of the Athanasian Creed, let them reflect rather whether it is not wiser to meet in a conciliatory spirit the well-meant efforts of a philosophical theory which may sincerely claim that its metaphysics enable it to grant to religion the substance, though not the shadow of its demands, and which challenges careful consideration of the question whether all the alternative systems do not do just the reverse, and sacrifice the substance to the shadow. Certainly religion can still less afford