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Rh reiterated this view in amicus curiae briefs filed in this Court and in the Second Circuit. The Government also informs us that United States embassies do not accept service of process when the United States is sued in a foreign court, and the Government expresses concern that accepting respondents’ interpretation of §1608 might imperil this practice. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae 25–26.

Contending that the State Department held a different view of Article 22(1) before 1974, respondents argue that the Department’s interpretation of the Vienna Convention is wrong, but we need not decide this question. By giving §1608(a)(3) its most natural reading, we avoid the potential international implications of a contrary interpretation.

Respondents’ remaining arguments do not alter our conclusion. First, respondents contend that §1608(a)(3) says nothing about where the service packet must be sent. See Brief for Respondents 22 (“the statute is silent as to the location where the service packet should be sent”). But while it is true that §1608(a)(3) does not expressly provide where service must be sent, it is common ground that this provision must implicitly impose some requirement. Respondents acknowledge this when they argue that the provision demands that service be sent “to a location that is likely to have a direct line of communication to the foreign minister.” Id., at 34; cf. post, at 6 (stating that sending a letter to a Washington-based embassy “with a direct line of communication” to the foreign minister seems as efficient as sending it to the minister’s office in the foreign state). The question, then, is precisely what §1608(a)(3) implicitly requires. Respondents assure us that a packet sent to “an embassy plainly would qualify,” while a packet sent to “a tourism office plainly would not.” Brief for Respondents 34. But if the test is whether “a