Page:Report on the Shrivenham train crash of 15 January 1936 - MoT Shrivenham1936.pdf/13

 of interest to note that apparently the first cost of track circuiting (Direct Current) through the Block Section (as opposed to Local installation), would not greatly differ from that of this system of Automatic Train Control (including locomotive equipment), averaged on the same basis of total track mileage.

16. The lack of synchronisation of the two signal box clocks at this station has been referred to. It appears to have been exceptional, but previous records for the express also disclosed considerable and varying differences; on this occasion the difference amounted to four or five minutes. As already stated, the Company's officers were at first inclined to think that Shrivenham was one minute slow and Ashbury Crossing three minutes fast; but it was finally concluded that the former was two minutes slow and the latter at least two minutes fast.

Ashbury Crossing depended upon Shrivenham for the daily time signal at 11.0 a.m.; but apparently the signalman at Ashbury Crossing, who was concerned in this accident, was neither making a practice of recording the signal nor of checking his clock when he was on the 6.0 a.m.-2.0 p.m. turn of duty. On such occasions, the necessary correction was thus made later in the day when the records sometimes indicated inaccuracy of as much as four minutes fast. This had not been observed, but the Stationmaster only examined the register once a month and did not cross-check with the Shrivenham records. To maintain a high standard of efficiency in this respect, the following points appear to be worthy of notice:-the method of transmission and the accuracy of the daily time signal; the conscientious adjustment of clocks, noting the error, on receipt of the signal; and the careful supervision and checking of registers by the Inspector and/or Stationmaster concerned.

17. With regard to the behaviour of the rolling stock in this collision, the outstanding feature was the fact that the body of the leading coach of the express, with perhaps 34 passengers in it, was partially hurled down the bank and practically turned upside down, the rear end becoming badly smashed, though the doors at the front end were still capable of being opened. The older all-timber body of the second coach collapsed. There was no fracture of screw couplings, but those on the first vehicle became unhooked and allowed these two coaches to be thrust aside; it is a matter for conjecture whether the Buckeye coupler (which this Company commenced to experiment with in 1922, decided to remove in 1929, and ceased to use in 1931) would have afforded more effectual protection, as it did recently at Welwyn Garden City, in view of the overturning of the engine in this case, its stoppage in 87 yards, and the much more rapid retardation of a heavier train.

There seems, however, to be little doubt that the Company's method of construction contributed to the comparatively low incidence of casualty, and, in view of the remarkable way in which the first coach survived, it is also impossible to say definitely whether the casualties therein would have been lessened by marshalling this vehicle behind the brake van. But there is no doubt as to the general preference in this respect, and I understand that, with rare exceptions, the brake van is next the engine when this train leaves Swindon. On the date in question, however, the coach concerned came from the Torquay branch and was marshalled in front when the engines were changed at Newton Abbot. There are at present no instructions to prohibit this; but the Company's officers informed me that, so far as it is practicable, steps will be taken in future to retain a brake van as the leading coach of long-distance trains.

18. The enginemen of the mineral train did not look back to observe the sidelights of the brake van, when the train was entering (5.15 a.m.) the goods running line at Ashbury Crossing. They were under no specific obligation to do so, but had they taken this precaution, as they did when passing Marston Crossing box, they should have become aware of the division.

Travelling at slow speed, the train could have been quickly stopped; there were no less than seven minutes available in which to do this and to advise the signalman to prevent the entry (5.22 a.m.) of the express into the section at Marston Crossing. I think it would be well to suggest to the Companies that consideration might be given to the practicability of strengthening Rule 126 (viii), for instance, by special reference to the importance of looking back while passing signal boxes.