Page:Report of the Select Committee on Intelligence United States Senate on Russian Active Measures Campaigns and Interference in the 2016 U.S. Election Volume 1.pdf/39

 talking about the issue altogether. One state official said, "We need to walk a fine line between being forthcoming to the public and protecting voter confidence."

(U) Mr. Brennan described a similar concern in IC and policy discussions: "We know that the Russians had already touched some of the electoral systems, and we know that they have capable cyber capabilities. So there was a real dilemma, even a conundrum, in terms of what do you do that's going to try to stave off worse action on the part of the Russians, and what do you do that is going to … [give] the Russians what they were seeking, which was to really raise the specter that the election was not going to be fair and unaffected."

(U) Most state representatives interviewed by the Committee were confident that they met the threat effectively in 2016 and believed that they would continue to defeat threats in 2018 and 2020. Many had interpreted the events of 2016 as a success story: firewalls deflected the hostile activity, as they were supposed to, so the threat was not an issue. One state official told the Committee, "I'm quite confident our state security systems are pretty sound." Another state official stated, "We felt good [in 2016]," and that due to additional security upgrades, "we feel even better today."

(U) However, as of 2018, some states were still grappling with the severity of the threat. One official highlighted the stark contrast they experienced, when, at one moment, they thought elections were secure, but then suddenly were hearing about the threat. The official went on to conclude, "I don't think any of us expected to be hacked by a foreign government." Another official, paraphrasing a former governor, said, "If a nation-state is on the other side, it's not a fair fight. You have to phone a friend."

(U) In the month before Election Day, DHS and other policymakers were planning for the worst-case scenario of efforts to disrupt the vote itself. Federal, state, and local governments created incident response plans to react to possible confusion at the polling places. Mr. Daniel said of the effort: "We're most concerned about the Russians, but obviously we are also concerned about the possibility for just plain old hacktivism on Election Day. … The incident response plan is actually designed … to help us [plan for] what is the federal government going to do if bad things start to happen on Election Day?"

Mr. Daniel added that this was the first opportunity to exercise the process established under Presidential Policy Directive-31. "We asked the various agencies with lead