Page:René Marchand - Allied Agents in Soviet Russia (1918).djvu/6

 plicity between certain Bolshevist leaders and Berlin, especially at the time of the arrival of Lenin in Russia, at the time of the abortive insurrection in July, and, finally, at the time of the definite disruption of the Army and the opening of pourparlers at Brest. The Allied Governments and their authorised representatives did not consider then that they could base either their attitude or their decisions on impressions which were supported subsequently by no positive facts, beyond violent controversies in the Press. Since then the international situation, has, in many respects, been greatly modified, and to-day it is difficult seriously to suppose that the Soviet Government has decided to bind its fortunes with those of the Central Empires; whose victory, whose mere continued existence, indeed, could not bring it any benefit, but would signify, on the contrary, the suppression of all revolutionary movements in Russia, in short its own destruction. That is why, whatever should be the future development of military events, I consider it unlikely that the Soviet Government would ever resolve to call Germany to its aid; it would be an alliance infinitely too dangerous to itself, and one which, moreover, would compromise it in the eyes of international Socialism—and, one must remember, of the Russian masses on whom it relies. It cannot be disputed that the Germans have succeeded in creating in this country, in the bosom of a people so little capable of hatred, a most profound and serious feeling of hostility.

One of the principal arguments commonly invoked to support the theory of the secret "alliance" between the Soviet Government and Germany is the complete inaction of the latter on the eastern front at a moment when it is particularly desirable for the Soviet Government to have its hands free militarily, and to be delivered of any German menace. This argument should not be considered. For any onlooker, however little attentive or informed he be, must realise that, if Germany leaves the Bolsheviks in power, it is not by choice—(she has to fear in her midst too great eventual repercussions)—it is by necessity, because she is materially deprived of the opportunity of doing otherwise.

Under the influence of our magnificent victories in the West, the effect of which is considerable, the anti-German animus amongst the Russian masses is becoming more and more active. In order to fight it, Germany is obliged to extend her occupation to fresh districts, or to reinforce her Army in the districts already held. She cannot think of this in face of the events in the West; and she can think of it the less because, in certain occupied regions, she can no longer rely on certain of her Landsturm units, which have been permeated little by little by Bolshevist propaganda.