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 the attorneys’ fees before the statutory enactment. Here, all of the attorneys’ fees were incurred after the effective date of the 1986 amendments.

In addition to the Supreme Court’s reaffirmation of the holding in Bradley, a certain logic supports the application of the 1986 attorneys’ fee provisions to this case, since Lockheed has some control in its strategic litigation decisions, while Lockheed no longer has control over conduct that preceded the 1986 Amendments.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the attorneys’ fee provisions of the 1986 Amendments to the FCA do not have retroactive effect and apply to this case.


 * G. Relator’s Share of the Recovery

Under the pre-1986 version of the FCA, relators were entitled to as little as zero, and not more than 25 percent, of any recovery in a case which the Government declined to intervene. See 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(c)(1) and (2) (1983). Under the 1986 Amendments, relators are entitled to “not less than 25 percent and not more than 30 percent of the proceeds of the action or settlement.” 31 U.S.C.A. § 3730(d)(2) (West Supp.1994).

Lockheed argues that the bounty provision of the 1986 Amendments have retroactive effect because the provision impairs the Government’s rights by increasing the relators’ share of the recovery, if any, at the Government’s expense. Hence, the increased recovery provision may not be applied retroactively and the relator’s are not entitled to a greater share of any recovery than they would have been entitled to under the pre-1986 FCA.

These provisions are procedural enactments which do not increase Lockheed’s liability to the Government and, hence, do not affect Lockheed’s substantive rights. Furthermore, the operative event for retroactivity purposes is the division of any award at the conclusion of a lawsuit, which in this case will occur after passage of the 1986 Amendments.

Accordingly, the Court finds that the bounty provisions of the 1986 Amendments to the FCA apply to this case.

The Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Lockheed’s Motion for Reconsideration as set forth above.

IT IS SO ORDERED.