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Rh Unlike Reed, the Court does not contend that the CCA’s interpretation lacked “authoritative” status until rehearing was denied. Instead, the Court merely proclaims that the State, acting through Goertz, did not deny Reed due process of law until “the state litigation ended.” Ante, at 5. I certainly see the logic in this view: until the process afforded by a State has been exhausted, it may be said that the State has not definitively denied the process that the Constitution is alleged to demand. This logic leads to the conclusion that a prisoner like Reed should exhaust state remedies—something that would generally be required if the proper vehicle for contesting the denial of a DNA testing claim were a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. See 28 U. S. C. §2254(b)(1). But the Court rejected that proposition in District Attorney’s Office for Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U. S. 52 (2009), and it is well-established that a §1983 plaintiff need not exhaust state remedies. Patsy v. Board of Regents of Fla., 457 U. S. 496, 500–501 (1982); Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U. S. 641, 649 (1997). Not only is this the general rule, but the Osborne Court found that the rule applies in cases involving constitutional challenges to the denial of requested DNA testing. 557 U. S., at 71. Thus, the Court’s reasoning collides with precedent.

On top of this, the Court’s reasoning, if taken to its logical conclusion, points to a result that neither Reed nor the Court is willing to embrace: namely, that a due process challenge to the denial of a request for DNA testing is not ripe until state remedies have been exhausted. (Reed