Page:Redd v. State (1897).pdf/6

462 to disregard it in a case of such serious consequences. It is the unquestioned rule that where that question in any case is submitted to the jury, its finding on the subject is final, unless the testimony shows conclusively that the witness was an accomplice. The question moreover is one of mixed law and fact. Edmonson v. State, 51 Ark. 115; Melton v. State, 43 Ark. 367.

The question not having been submitted to the jury, and in view of the fact that witness was jointly indicted for this offense with the two defendants on trial, that the indictment against him is still undisposed of in any way, and the extraneous evidence adduced on the trial tending to connect the witness with the commission of the crime of murdering Skipper, although somewhat meagre, and not at all satisfactory, as may be admitted, we, or at least a majority of us, are of opinion that the witness McKay is to be regarded as an accomplice, and his testimony is admissible under the rules governing that of an accomplice.

The language of the statute on the subject, as digested in Sandels & Hill's Digest, is as follows:

"Section 2911. 'When two or more persons are indicted in the same indictment, either may testify in behalf of or against the other defendant or defendants." Act approved March 2, 1893.

"Section 2246. Where two or more persons are indicted in the same indictment, and the court is of opinion that the evidence in regard to a particular individual is not sufficient to put him on his defense, it must, on motion of either party desiring to use such defendant as a witness, order him to be discharged from the indictment, and permit him to be examined by the party so moving. The order is an acquittal of such defendant, and a bar to another prosecution for the same offense." Criminal Code, § 233.