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3, 1905. reason for making a thorough inquiry not only into the circumstances attending the accident, but also into the design and construction of the bridge and even the surveys and plans which were made to decide the location of the road and its elevation above the surrounding lands and streams. Such an investigation would have to be made on the ground, of course; not by correspondence from a city 2,000 miles distant.

The collision (e) is one in which the need of a full inquiry is especially important, because it occurred on a road where the block system is in use. The block system is the best means known for preventing collisions of this kind, and when it fails or appears to fail the exact circumstances should be laid before the public to the end that the responsibility for the resulting collision may be clearly understood. The securing of the facts in such a case obviously demands an inquiry on the ground. In the present case it appears that dependence was placed on the rear flagman of the foremost train to go back with hand signals; this as a supplementary safeguard in addition to the block signals; but he failed to do so, or failed to go as far as he ought to have gone. It also appears that the flagman was a person of limited experience in the duties of his position.

Derailment No. 10 was the wrecking of a passenger train while crossing a trestle, in consequence of the bridge giving way. Eighty-eight persons were killed, the engine and all of the cars of the train except two being swept down by the flood which wrecked the bridge. According to the report of the railroad company, the bridge was knocked down by floating wreckage, which struck it while the train was on the bridge. The report says:

A volume of water more than 20 ft. deep came down an arroya which is usually dry, filling the channel and overflowing the banks. It came with such rapidity as to displace the county wagon bridge situated about 1,000 ft. up the stream, which wagon bridge was thrown against the railroad bridge with such violence as to force it from its bearings at the very time the train was crossing the stream.

There was no water flowing in this arroya when two trains passed over the same bridge less than one hour before the catastrophe, and it was not raining at this point at the time the wreck occurred. In the river into which this arroya empties, half a mile from the bridge, the flow of water below the confluence was 40 cu. ft. per second on the morning before the disaster, and it was 1,000 cu. ft. per second on the morning after. In the interval it had reached a maximum of 4,000 cu. ft. per second. The road has been operated for 33 years and the permanent way has been on practically the same grade and the same alinement across this arroya during all this time. The bridge that was washed away was in thoroughly good condition immediately preceding the accident. The conductor who was in charge of the train had served the company in that capacity 22 years and the engineman 21 years.

Collision No. 23, killing 63 persons, occurred in daylight. The conductor and the engineman of the westbound train forgot a meeting order which had been delivered to them about 35 minutes before. The engineman was killed in the collision, but there is satisfactory evidence that he had correctly read the order which he had received. He is said to have read the order to the fireman, but this appears to have done no good. The fireman was killed. The conductor simply forgot that he had the order. The conductor thinks that he read the order to the flagman, as he is required by rule to do, but the flagman says that he did not. These two trains were running on long-established schedules and had often met at the station which was prescribed in this case, on orders similar to this one. There were no other trains on this part of the road at this time. The most of the victims of the wreck were passengers riding in two passenger cars of comparatively light construction in the eastbound train, which were between a large and heavy baggage car and a heavy vestibuled passenger car. Behind this vestibuled car were three sleeping cars. The negligent conductor and engineman were men of long experience, good records, and excellent characters.

Collision No. 24 occurred to a passenger train, running at high speed, near a station where the switches had no interlocking or distant signals.

Collision No. 11 was due to the running of a part of a freight train on the main line from one station to another without having the right to the track; and the error which led to this movement was a mistake in or misunderstanding of hand signals on the s part of a brakeman and an engineman. The engineman, who had had only four months’ experience on this road, though he had served several years on other roads, absconded the day after the collision. The brakeman had had only five months’ experience as such, though he had worked for the same company in a bridge-repair gang for five years. It appears that not only did the men in charge of this train disobey the rule against running from station to station without an order from the despatcher, but also neglected to send a flagman in either direction. The conductor of the train had had seven months’ experience as such on this road and 20 years’ experience elsewhere. The fireman of this freight train, who had served five years, part of the time as extra engineman, was the only person on the train who had been in the train service of the company more than seven months.

Collision No. 5 occurred in the daytime and at a point less than one-fourth mile beyond a block-signal station, the foremost train having stopped at that point to take water. As soon as this train had passed the block-signal station (station B) the signalman (station agent) gave the prescribed telegraphic signal to the next block station in the rear (station A), and a following passenger train was started from A in about two minutes thereafter. It reached B in about four minutes, or six minutes after the foremost train stopped at the water tank. The operator at B appears to have telegraphed to A without first putting his own outdoor signal in the stop position. This operator was a man of 11 years’ experience, with a good record.

The rear flagman of the foremost train, who, according to the rule, should have signaled the following train in season to stop it before it should collide with his own train, did not do so, going back only a short distance, and that apparently after some delay. This flagman was 23 years old and had been in the service seven months.

Derailment No. 4 occurred on a grade of about 2 per cent., some 10 miles long. The train consisted of 36 cars, with air-brakes in service on 25 cars. The inspectors reported all in good order at the starting point at the head of the grade. The control of the speed of the train was intrusted to the conductor and brakemen, the engineman being required by rule to use air-brakes only in emergencies. After running two or three miles at high speed the train broke apart behind the 19th car. This break is believed to have been due to the breaking of a wheel, and most of the rear part of the train was wrecked at this point. The forward portion ran several miles farther, when the engine was derailed at a curve and the whole of the cars were wrecked. It is believed that the air-brakes were not operative behind the first car, as there is some circumstantial evidence that none of them acted as they should have done, automatically, when the break occurred. It is supposed, therefore, that the angle cock at the rear end of the first car had been closed by some means not discovered. Both conductor and engineman were killed.

Collision No. 2, like No. 5, was due to a failure in block working. Collision No. 7 occurred on a line where block signaling appears to be in force, but it was “permissive blocking.” It appears to be clear that the fault lies with the engineman of the second train. The men on this train had been on duty 16½ hours.

Collision No. 13 illustrates the complicated nature of some of the rules under which trains are run on single-track lines. This case may be described as follows: Extra 324 north and fourth 56 south met in collision north of E, killing three men and damaging two engines and 21 cars. The stations and distances on this line are as follows: There were four sections of train No. 56 from G to E, and there were to have been three sections from E to A. Third 56 was turned at E, where it set off its cars, and engine and crew started for G as an extra before extra 324 arrived. At D extra 324 received an order reading, “Extra 324 has right of track against third 56 D to E. Extra 325 has right of track against third 56 B (E. D. T.) to D.” Upon arriving at E, engineman of extra 324 received a meet order with train No. 50 at F; inquired if third 56 had arrived, but asked nothing about signals, and when informed that third 56 had been there, proceeded without any orders. He had met second 56 at C and noted that it carried signals, which plainly showed that there would be a third section of train to C; and from the order that he received at D he knew that extra 325, which was following him, had right of track against third 56 to D. The crew of extra 324 therefore knew that there would be three sections of 56 south of E, and also knew that they had met but two sections. Operator did not notify crew of extra 324 that third 56 had arrived carrying signals, and conductor of the train left his work to the flagman, making no effort to stop train when he knew that he had no right to proceed beyond E.

Collision No. 19 was due to a combination of causes, one of which was unusual. The conductor and engineman of a westbound train had orders to meet two eastbound passenger trains at a certain station, where the westbound did not stop. On approaching that station the engineman received from the operator a go-head signal by flag, and took this for a clear block-signal, superseding the telegraphic meeting order which he