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 of that potential. The public disclosure of information obtained confidentially from allies and partners may damage Australia's relationship with those allies and partners. Such disclosure may reduce their willingness to share information with Australia and Australia may not be informed of that change in attitude. If that occurred, it would disadvantage ADF operations and, more broadly, would be to the detriment of Australia's international relations and national security interests.

124․ Further, the public disclosure of identities of any Special Operations Command or Special Forces personnel may have exposed those personnel and their families to an increased risk of attack and harassment and may have exposed them to exploitation by foreign intelligence services. While there is no evidence that this has occurred, it is an ongoing concern to the ADF.

125․ The ADF has taken steps in respect of future operations because of the possibility that an unauthorised person has accessed the material. Those steps are outlined in a confidential annexure to the Agreed Statement of Facts, which was admitted into evidence and which I have read but which it is not necessary to say any more about.

126․ If a person had read or copied the documents found at Mr McBride's Griffith property, the information contained in those documents may have given rise to certain risks:


 * (a) The public disclosure of information which would likely prejudice future collection and analysis of intelligence, risk of damage to critical international relationships and risk prejudicing the security of future ADF operations.


 * (b) The public disclosure of information relating to ROE risks informing Australia's adversaries of the limits of the ADF's use of force. This would give adversaries tactical advantages, including by employing methods that took advantage of the limitations imposed by the ROE. That would give rise to an increased risk of harm to ADF personnel and compromise the effectiveness of current and future military operations.


 * (c) Some documents reveal sensitive information such as policies, capabilities and response times, the public disclosure of which would prejudice their ongoing effectiveness and which could be employed to the detriment of Australia or its partners by domestic or overseas adversaries.

127․ Although the three journalists to whom disclosures were made were professional journalists, they were not authorised to receive the classified documents. The risks relating to identification of Special Operations Command or Special Forces personnel