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 with donkeys/farm animals". The wrong group was targeted and civilians were killed. The submission contended that there was no basis for an investigation of the war crime of murder because there was nothing to suggest that the boys were deliberately targeted with the knowledge that they were not insurgents. Despite this, the submission records that a decision was made to conduct an investigation into the war crime of murder.

67․ Section D related to an incident on 26 September 2013. A child was killed when a bullet went through the body of an armed individual and into an unseen sleeping child behind him during a night engagement. The submission contended that the circumstances did not give rise to a suspicion of a crime that would warrant an investigation. A sensitive incident was not synonymous with a suspicious one. The submission contended that the appropriate method to investigate the incident was an Administrative Inquiry, until some suspicious piece of evidence emerged. The submission pointed out that, ultimately, the experienced inquiry team cleared the soldiers.

68․ Section E related to an incident on 28 April 2013. This was an incident where one or more (the submission was ambiguous) dead insurgents' hands were removed in order to identify whether any one of them was a key bomb maker. The submission indicated that this involved a failure to distinguish between an incident which was sensitive and one which was suspicious. The section on this incident was lengthy. It contended that the soldier's actions were justified by military necessity and that the soldier had received a lecture from an ADFIS member who had given him the impression that removing the whole hand was best practice to ensure accurate identification. The submission criticised the commencement of a disciplinary investigation in circumstances where the action had been investigated and no administrative action had been recommended. It criticised the finding of the Administrative Inquiry that the officer in question had exercised "poor judgment" by failing to appreciate potential responses from "the Australian public and media". The submission criticised the lack of support from the Minister for Defence and the Chief of the Defence Force when, on 30 August 2013, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC) reported on the incident. It criticised the proposition that Special Forces should have to consider what the "Australian media" might think of their actions during combat. Finally, the submission contended that if there was a failure, it was a failure by the Army to train the officer properly if the practice was so abhorrent. It noted that there was no criticism of the Army at all in the documentation.

69․ Section F introduced the investigations of incidents that occurred on 3 October 2010 and 23 September 2013. These were both cases in which an ADF member was momentarily alone in a room with a suspected insurgent. In both cases, the ADF member said that the suspected insurgent made an attempt to attack him, the first by grabbing a sickle-like