Page:Qualifications for President and the “Natural Born” Citizenship Eligibility Requirement.pdf/27

 in the constitution; still more that they should have come to that conclusion without even once declaring their object. The treatise in question by Emmerich de Vattel was a work concerning the “law of nations,” which we would now classify generally as “international law.” However, the concept of citizenship within a particular country is one governed not by international law or law of nations, but rather is governed by municipal law, that is, the internal law of each country. Vattel’s writings on citizenship by “descent” reflected in many circumstances what the law or practice may have been in certain European nations at the time—that is, that citizenship followed the nationality or citizenship of one’s father, as opposed to the place of birth. This concept, although prevalent on the European Continent was, even as expressly noted in Vattel’s work itself, clearly not the law in England or thus the American colonies, and clearly was not the concept and common understanding upon which U.S. law was based. James Madison, often referred to as the “Father of the Constitution,” expressly explained in the House of Representatives in the First Congress, in 1789, that with regard to citizenship the “place” of birth, and not “parentage” was the controlling concept adopted in the United States. Additionally, the Supreme Court in 1971 simply and succinctly explained, after citing historical legal precedent: “We thus have an acknowledgment that our law in this area follows English concepts with an acceptance of the jus soli, that is, the place of birth governs citizenship status except as modified by statute.” Again in 1998, the Supreme Court expressly recognized jus soli, the place of birth, as controlling in the United States, noting that in this country “citizenship does not pass by descent” except as provided by Congress in statute. Rh