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Rh One final point bears emphasis: To the extent any doubt remains about whether §1101(a)(43)(S) requires that an investigation or proceeding be pending, the phrase “relating to obstruction of justice” resolves the doubt. Cf. Mellouli v. Lynch, 575 U. S. 798, 811–812, n. 11 (2015). The phrase “relating to” ensures that this statute covers offenses that have “a connection with” obstruction of justice—which surely covers common obstruction offenses that can occur when an investigation or proceeding is not pending. Coventry Health Care of Mo., Inc. v. Nevils, 581 U. S. 87, 96 (2017) (internal quotation marks omitted). By contrast, in defining certain other aggravated felonies in this statute, Congress did not employ the broad phrase “relating to.” See, e.g., 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(A) (“murder, rape, or sexual abuse of a minor”).

For all of those reasons, an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending.