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18 offense described in section 1956 of title 18 (relating to laundering of money instruments).” §1101(a)(43)(D) (emphasis added). This structure, which the INA repeats well over a dozen times, see §§§ [sic]1101(a)(43)(D)–(E), (H)–(N), confirms that the phrase “relating to” is used in the INA simply to introduce (not expand upon) a general description of the intended crime category.

The Court’s seemingly expansive reading of “in relation to” is also refuted by its consequences for the statutory text. If all that is required is a “connection with” something that “obstruct[s] the wheels of justice,”, then the Government has open season to argue that all sorts of crimes that hinder law enforcement (e.g., failing to report a crime) or make detection of a crime more difficult (e.g., money laundering) qualify as offenses “relating to obstruction of justice.” On this approach, certain other aggravated felonies listed in the INA (e.g., §1101(a)(43)(D) (money laundering)) will collapse into “obstruction of justice,” leading to substantial superfluity in the statute. Indeed, the separate categories of perjury and bribery of a witness listed in the very same subparagraph, §1101(a)(43)(S), will themselves be part of that collapse.

More importantly, an expansive reading of “in relation to” opens the door for the Government to argue that many low-level offenses that fall outside of core obstruction of justice are “aggravated” felonies, even though the INA reserves that label for “especially egregious felonies.” Esquivel-Quintana, 581 U. S., at 394. For example, misdemeanor convictions for failing to report a crime, presenting false identification to an officer, refusing to aid a police officer, leaving the scene of a crime, or purchasing a fake ID could be taken to count as “relating to obstruction of justice.” See Brief for National Immigrant Justice Center et al. as Amici