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16 (§241.6). See. Even setting aside the now-familiar circularity of this reasoning, this definition does not help the majority either. In describing witness tampering, the MPC reformers chose to depart from “laws requiring that a proceeding or investigation actually be pending,” §241.6, Comment 2, at 166, by requiring only a “belie[f] that an official proceeding or investigation is pending or about to be instituted,” §241.6(1) (emphasis added). That intentional departure is reason alone to treat this MPC description with caution when articulating generic obstruction of justice. Yet, the majority goes much further than the MPC reformers by dismissing the notion that at least a foreseeable investigation or proceeding should be required. See. That statement by the Court reflects just how far afield it has wandered from the heartland of obstruction of justice.

Perhaps sensing the weakness of its evidence, the Court falls back on the Government’s “commonsense point,” Reply Brief 4, that “one can obstruct the wheels of justice even before the wheels have begun to move,”. Yet the intuitive idea that “obstruction can only arise when justice is being administered,” Pettibone, 148 U. S., at 207, finds support in common sense to at least the same degree. But while both formulations find some support in common sense, the same cannot be said regarding other clues about generic meaning. Considered together, the relevant history, dictionaries, and federal and state laws provide powerful evidence that obstruction of justice “as commonly understood,” Descamps, 570 U. S., at 257, when Congress enacted 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S) in 1996, requires a pending investigation or proceeding.

In a feeble attempt to shore up its argument, the Court resorts to a seemingly limitless construction of “relating to obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), according to which