Page:Pugin v. Garland.pdf/16

4 and against the possibility that Chapter 73 might define (in substance) the universe of offenses that “relat[e] to obstruction of justice,” §1101(a)(43)(S), as Congress meant that phrase to be interpreted. Nor would running that issue to ground here change the outcome. As the Court notes, multiple Chapter 73 offenses require no pending proceeding. §1512(f); see also 102 Stat. 4397–4398 (1988 Congress describing an amendment to §1512 as an “obstruction of justice amendmen[t]” (boldface deleted)). That suffices to resolve the question before us even under a Chapter 73-focused approach. The issue of whether such an approach best tracks Congress’s intent can be reserved for future consideration in a case where the parties joust in earnest on the question.