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Rh

, concurring.

I agree with the Court that the Ninth Circuit wrongly embraced a pending-proceeding requirement when it assessed what types of prior offenses qualify as “offense[s] relating to obstruction of justice” under 8 U. S. C. §1101(a)(43)(S), for purposes of determining the “aggravated felon[ies]” that render noncitizens deportable, §1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). This means, of course, that I also agree with the Court’s conclusion that the Fourth Circuit rightly rejected any such pending-proceeding requirement.

I write separately to highlight one (possibly sufficient) reason why a predicate offense need not have a nexus to a pending or ongoing investigation or judicial proceeding in order to qualify as “an offense relating to obstruction of justice” within the meaning of this immigration statute. The