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10 Fourth, Pugin and Cordero-Garcia invoke the rule of lenity. But even assuming that the rule of lenity can be invoked in this particular civil immigration context, the rule applies only if “after seizing everything from which aid can be derived,” there remains “grievous ambiguity.” Ocasio v. United States, 578 U. S. 282, 295, n. 8 (2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, applying the traditional tools of statutory interpretation, we have concluded that an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. So we have no basis for resorting to the rule of lenity. See, e.g., Shaw v. United States, 580 U. S. 63, 71 (2016); Salman v. United States, 580 U. S. 39, 51 (2016); Abramski v. United States, 573 U. S. 169, 188, n. 10 (2014); cf. Kawashima v. Holder, 565 U. S. 478, 489 (2012).

In sum, we conclude that an offense “relating to obstruction of justice” under §1101(a)(43)(S) does not require that an investigation or proceeding be pending. We therefore disagree with the argument raised by Pugin and Cordero-Garcia for excluding their obstruction offenses from the broad coverage of §1101(a)(43)(S). We affirm the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. We reverse the judgment of the U. S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered.