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pp. 8–41] subjects of the investigation—I speak only of cultivated and intelligent people, whom I have allowed to indulge in reveries, apparently unintentionally and without previous instruction—have exhibited affect–expressions which can be registered experimentally. But the basic thought of these, even with the best of intentions, they could express only incompletely or even not at all. One meets with an abundance of similar experiences in association experiments and psychoanalysis—indeed, there is hardly an unconscious complex which has not at some time existed as a phantasy in consciousness. However, more instructive are the experiences from the domain of psychopathology. But those arising in the field of the hysterias and neuroses, which are characterized by an overwhelming transference tendency, are rarer than the experiences in the territory of the introversion type of neuroses and psychoses, which constitute by far the greater number of the mental derangements, at least the collected Schizophrenic group of Bleuler. As has already been indicated by the term "introversion," which I briefly introduced in my study, "Konflikte der kindlichen Seele," pp. 6 and 10, these neuroses lead to an over-powering autoerotism (Freud). And here we meet with this unutterable purely phantastic thinking, which moves in inexpressible symbols and feelings. One gets a slight impression of this when one seeks to examine the paltry and confused expressions of these people. As I have frequently observed, it costs these patients endless trouble and effort to put their phantasies into common human speech. A highly intelligent patient, who interpreted such a phantasy piece by piece, often said to me, "I know absolutely with what it is concerned, I see and feel everything, but it is quite impossible for me to find the words to express it." The poetic and religious introversion gives rise to similar experiences; for example, Paul, in the Epistle to the Romans viii:26—"For we know not what we should pray for as we ought: but the Spirit itself maketh intercession with groanings which cannot be uttered." 16 Similarly, James remarks, "The great difference, in fact, between that simple kind of rational thinking which consists in the concrete objects of past experience merely suggesting each other, and reason distinctively so called, is this, that whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reasoning is productive." 17 Compare the impressive description of Petrarch's ascent of Mt. Ventoux, by Jacob Burckhardt ("Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italian," 1869, p. 235): "One now awaits a description of the view, but in vain, not because the poet is indifferent to it, but, on the contrary, because the impression affects him all too strongly. His entire past life, with all its follies, passes before him; he recalls that it is ten years ago to-day that he, as a young man, left Bologna, and he turns a yearning glance toward Italy. He opens a book—'Confessions of St. Augustine,' his companion at that time—and his eye falls upon this passage in the tenth chapter: 'and the people went there and admired the high mountains, the wide wastes of the sea and the mighty downward rushing streams, and the ocean and the courses of the stars, and forgot themselves.' His brother, to whom he reads these words, cannot comprehend why, at this point, he closes the book and is silent."

18 Wundt gives a striking description of the scholastic method in his "Philosophische Studien," XIII, p. 345. The method consists "first in this, that one realizes the chief aim of scientific investigation is the