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 the idea of the Will in Schopenhauer, for we can conceive Will objectively, only as a manifestation of an internal desire. This throwing of psychological perceptions into material reality is characterized philosophically as "introjection." (Ferenczi's conception of "introjection" denoted the reverse, that is, the taking of the outer world into the inner world.)[14] Naturally, the conception of the world was distorted by introjection. Freud's conception of the principle of desire is a voluntary formulation of the idea of introjection, while his once more voluntarily conceived "principle of reality" corresponds functionally to that which I designate as "corrective of reality," and R. Avenarius[15] designates as "empiriokritische Prinzipialkoordination." The conception of power owes its existence to this very introjection; this has already been said expressively by Galileo in his remark that its origin is to be sought in the subjective perception of the muscular power of the individual. Because we have already arrived at the daring assumption that the libido, which was employed originally in the exclusive service of egg and seed production, now appears firmly organized in the function of nest-building, and can no longer be employed otherwise; similarly this conception forces us to relate it to every desire, including hunger. For now we can no longer make any essential distinction between the will to build a nest and the will to eat. This view brings us to a conception of libido, which extends over the boundaries of the physical sciences into a philosophical aspect—to a conception of the will in general. I must give this bit of psychological "Voluntarismus" into the hands of the