Page:Protestant Exiles from France Agnew vol 1.djvu/463

 put in writing the very morning the misfortune happened to me, and proposed to a council of war, where the same was agreed to, had been duly executed, Marshal Tesse could never have relieved the place, which must necessarily have fallen into our hands in a very few days.

“Not long after the siege was raised, news came of the surrender of Barcelona to King Charles, and about a month after, that Marshal Tesse had marched with the best part of the forces quartered on the frontier of Portugal, in order to join the Duke of Anjou and besiege Barcelona again.

“Upon this I resolved to propose to the Portuguese to march to Madrid, concluding that either the Duke of Anjou would by this means be obliged to quit the siege of Barcelona, or else that we could meet with no opposition in our way. For this purpose I took a journey to Lisbon, even while my wound, upon the cutting off of my arm, was still open, and had such success with the King of Portugal, that his troops took the field the following spring by the 26th of March (n.s.) under the command of the Marquis das Minas, with intention to besiege Alcantara, and march that way to Madrid. Meantime the Duke of Berwick, who had been sent to command on the frontiers of Portugal in Marshal Tesse’s stead, had thrown ten regiments of foot into Badajoz, and marched with seven more, and a body of 4000 horse towards Alcantara, in order to reinforce that garrison, by the addition of those seven regiments, which he accordingly left there, and then came back to Brocas with his cavalry, where we surprised him, beat his rear-guard, pursued him a considerable way, and took possession of the castle of Brocas; in which place we left a garrison to cover our foragers, during the time we should lie before Alcantara.

“After this we continued our march to Alcantara, which surrendered to us in a very few days; we took ten good battalions prisoners of war there, and found about sixty pieces of cannon in the place, with great store of small arms and ammunition.

“After the surrender of Alcantara we crossed the Tagus there, and having taken some places of small note upon our march, and forced a pass at Massagona, where the enemy had entrenched themselves, we advanced as far as the bridge of Almaras.

“But here the Portuguese resolved unanimously to return home again, notwithstanding all the arguments the Generals of the allies could offer to the contrary, which happened very unfortunately. For had the army marched directly from thence to Madrid, in all probability we must have arrived there at the same time with the news of the Duke of Anjou’s being returned to France; the Duchess must have been obliged to escape alone; and the tribunals being still there, 'tis very likely the war would have been over.

“Some of the Portuguese were willing to go back and besiege Badajoz, which was entirely laying aside all thoughts of Madrid. But others were for attacking Ciudad Rodrigo, and, by joining with these, I engaged them, after the taking of that place, to go to Madrid. But the time which was lost on this occasion had given the Duke of Anjou an opportunity of returning from France to Madrid, from whence he withdrew the court and all the tribunals, before our army could reach that place. So upon our arrival there, we found Madrid an open village; and the troops having been extremely weakened by so long a march, were not above 4000 horse and 8 or 10,000 foot.

“The Portuguese Generals and those of the allies thought it highly necessary the King of Spain should come to Madrid as soon as possible. For besides the advantage his presence might have been to his own affairs, it was of the last importance to us to be immediately joined by the forces with the king and under the Earl of Peterborow’s command; not being strong enough without them to attack the Duke of Anjou, who had already received some succours from France, besides the 5500 horse and 8000 foot, of which the Duke of Berwick’s army consisted, after he had been joined by the Conde de las Torres.

“Being perfectly informed of the enemy’s strength and motions, and having great reasons to believe that if we were joined in time by all the forces with the King and the Earl of Peterborow, we might in this favourable conjuncture drive the Duke of Anjou entirely out of Spain, make ourselves absolute masters of that kingdom, and put an end to an expensive war — all the while we lay at Madrid and Guadalaxara I despatched every day one or more expresses, and the greatest part of them officers, with letters to the King of Spain and my Lord Peterborow, representing to them both the importance of our being joined forthwith, and earnestly desiring that no time might be lost in improving so critical a juncture.

“As the next best means to advise our friends of our arrival at Madrid, the first gazette day after we got thither, I caused it to be published in the gazette that we were there, and expected in a very few days to be joined by the King and the Earl of Peterborow, hoping that the natural curiosity of the Spaniards would give a printed newspaper a free passage.

“But notwithstanding all the diligence that was used in this manner on our part, near six weeks were elapsed at Madrid and Guadalaxara before we received any advice that the king was upon his march to join us; and in the meantime, the Duke of Anjou’s army was so much increased by daily reinforcements from several parts, that he was now become superior in number to us, even after we were joined by those forces which the king and my Lord Peterborow brought along with them.

“And I must say it is the general opinion, and I do verily believe, that as the Portuguese lost one fair opportunity of putting an end to the war by not marching directly from the bridge of Almaras to Madrid, so we lost another for want of being joined in time by the forces under the command of the King of Spain and the Earl of Peterborow. 