Page:Protective Intelligence and Threat Assessment Investigations - A Guide for State and Local Law Enforcement Officials.pdf/24

 *None of the 43 assassins and attackers communicated a direct threat to the target before their attack.
 * Fewer than one-tenth of all 83 attackers and near-lethal approachers communicated a direct threat to the target or to a law enforcement agency.
 * Two-thirds of the assassins and near-lethal approachers were known to have spoken or written in a manner suggesting that they were considering an attack. Would-be assassins told family members, friends, colleagues, and associates about their thoughts and plans, or they wrote down their ideas in journals or diaries.

These data do not suggest that investigators should ignore threats that are communicated to or about public officials or figures. Many persons may have been prevented or deterred from taking action because of a prompt response to their threatening communications. However, careful attention should also be paid to identifying, investigating, and assessing anyone whose behaviors suggest that he or she might pose threats of violence, even if the individual does not communicate direct threats to a target or to the authorities.

Three key observations about assassins and their behaviors emerged from the ECSP study:

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 * Assassinations and attacks on public officials and figures are the products of understandable and often discernible processes of thinking and behavior.
 * Most people who attack others perceive the attack as the means to a goal or a way to solve a problem.
 * An individual's motives and selection of a target are directly connected.