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 things, and not dyadically, nor according to divine difference. That number however, is the first thing in intellectuals, we have abundantly shown.

CHAPTER XXXIII.
Parmenides begins to speak about it as follows: “Proceed therefore, and still farther consider this. What? We have said that the one participates of essence, so far as it is being. We have said so. And on this account the one being appears to be many.” But he completes his discourse about the first monad thus: “Are not three (things odd, and two even? How should they not?” And about the second monad, as follows: “Hence there will be the evenly-even, and the oddly-odd, and the oddly-even, and the evenly-odd.” But he completes his discourse about the third and all the succeeding triad, as follows: “The one being therefore, is not only many, but it is likewise necessary that the one which is distributed by being should be many. Entirely so.” The first triad, therefore, of the intelligible, and at the same time, intellectual Gods, is through these things unfolded to us by Plato, and which possesses indeed, according to the first monad the first powers of numbers, I mean the odd and the even, and is completed through these principles which were in intelligibles occultly, viz. monad, duad, triad. But according to the second monad it possesses the second powers of numbers which subsist from these [i. e. from the first powers]. For the section of the forms of the even number, is allotted a second order. And the oddly-odd is subordinate to the first odd numbers. But according to the third monad, it possesses the more partial causes of divine numbers. Hence also, a separation into minute parts, infinity,