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CHAPTER VI.
therefore, if indeed the supercelestial place is the imparticipable and occult genus of the intelligible Gods, how can we establish so great a divine multitude there, and this accompanied with separation, viz. truth, science, justice, temperance, the meadow, and Adrastia? For neither do the fountains of the virtues, nor the separation and variety of forms, pertain to the intelligible Gods. For the first and most unical of forms extend the demiurgic intellect of wholes to the intelligible paradigm, and the comprehension of forms which is there. But Socrates in the Phædrus says that a partial intellect contemplates the supercelestial place. For this intellect is the governor of the soul, as it is well said by the philosophers prior to us. If therefore, it be necessary from this analogy to investigate the difference of intelligibles, as the demiurgic intellect indeed, is imparticipable, but a partial intellect is participable, so with respect to the intelligible, one indeed which is the first paradigm of the demiurgus, pertains to the first intelligibles, but another which is the first paradigm of a partial intellect pertains to the second intelligibles, which are indeed intelligibles, but are allotted an intelligible transcendency, as subsisting at the summit of intellectuals. But if the supercelestial place is beyond the celestial circulation, but is inferior to those intelligible triads, because it is more expanded; for it is the plain of truth, and is not unknown, is divided according to a multitude of forms, and possesses a variety of powers, and the meadow which is there nourishes souls, and is visible to them, the first intelligibles illuminating souls with ineffable union, but not being known by them through intelligence;—if this be the case, it is certainly necessary that the supercelestial place should subsist between the intelligible nature, and the celestial circulation. If Plato himself also admits that essence which truly is, exists in this place, how is it possible that he should not also admit it to be intelligible, and to