Page:Problems of Empire.djvu/50

PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE. out how the British fleets, which by Lord St. Vincent's strategy were continually maintained before Brest, Rochefort, Ferrol, and Toulon, were the real obstacles to the army of invasion. Our greatest naval victory won by our greatest naval hero was merely an incident in that well-planned campaign. The battle of Trafalgar was not necessary to prevent England being invaded, but it did render the prospect of invading England hopeless.

As it was then, so it will be again to-day. In the event of war with France—and France is the only power whose fleet gives her the least prospect of being able to invade Great Britain—our protection against invasion will not consist in forts on the English coast, however well manned, and however well armed. By far the finest portion of the French Navy is now in the Mediterranean. The force maintained in the ports on the Atlantic and the Channel is comparatively insignificant. Our energies will be devoted to keeping the Mediterranean squadron in port; and if, as many naval authorities now hold, a blockade is no longer possible, we must bar the passage into the ocean through the Straits of Gibraltar. As in the day of Napoleon, so now, we shall hold the interior position and be able to combine our fleets at will. Our defence against invasion will rest primarily with the Mediterranean fleet. If that fleet is defeated in battle, and such a contingency has to be contemplated, it will not be defeated without inflicting serious damage on its opponents. To provide against such a contingency the Navy must be of sufficient strength in battleships to admit of a reserve squadron being maintained, capable of meeting the French Mediterranean fleet after it has been in conflict 32