Page:Problems of Empire.djvu/131

FEDERAL FINANCE. {| class="table horizborder colar2"
 * England.
 * Scotland.
 * Ireland.
 * Licences
 * 3,550,000
 * 375,000
 * 211,000
 * Railway duty
 * 315,000
 * 24,000
 * Land tax and. house duty
 * 2,321,000
 * 146,000
 * Stamps
 * 6,939,000
 * 623,000
 * 290,000
 * Miscellaneous revenue
 * 792,000
 * 82,000
 * 116,000
 * Crown lands
 * 408,000
 * 24,000
 * 33,000
 * 14,325,000
 * 1,274,000
 * 650,000
 * Expenditure on civil administration
 * 22,559,000
 * 3,227,000
 * 5,919,000
 * Deficiency
 * 8,234,000
 * 1,953,000
 * 5,269,000
 * }
 * 408,000
 * 24,000
 * 33,000
 * 14,325,000
 * 1,274,000
 * 650,000
 * Expenditure on civil administration
 * 22,559,000
 * 3,227,000
 * 5,919,000
 * Deficiency
 * 8,234,000
 * 1,953,000
 * 5,269,000
 * }
 * 8,234,000
 * 1,953,000
 * 5,269,000
 * }

This deficiency could be made good by grants from the Imperial exchequer, and this is the course which commends itself to some of those who have studied the subject with me. The objections to it are that the proportion of the revenues of the national authorities which would be allocated to them, or under their own control, would be insufficient to give that sense of financial responsibility which it is so desirable that they should possess. This objection applies with especial force to the case of Ireland, in which only one-eighth of the national revenue would be allocated to the national authority. 'Grants of money,' say Lord Farrer, Lord Welby, and Mr. Currie in the report already quoted, 'made by Parliament are more likely to impoverish than enrich the community which receives them, tending as they do to weaken the spirit of independence and self-reliance.' To this weighty opinion I attach the utmost importance. The system of grants from the Imperial revenue in aid of local taxation certainly does not tend to economy in local expenditure. A plan based on large grants from the Imperial exchequer to the national authorities would have a similar effect 113