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PROBLEMS OF EMPIRE. excise, and the national authority on that from estate duties and income tax, or vice versâ—in other words, if the whole burden of one or other category of expenditure fell on a limited class of taxpayers, and the masses of the people who possess the voting power were unaffected by it there would be no efficient check on extravagant expenditure for Imperial or national purposes,

3. It is desirable that the Imperial authority should have under its own control sufficient revenues to meet the Imperial expenditure.—If the Imperial authority had to call on the national authorities to contribute to Imperial funds in the event of war or for any other reason, there would obviously be grave danger of conflict between the Imperial and national authorities. The war for which the increased expenditure was required might be unpopular in one of the countries of the United Kingdom (a recent instance of this will occur to every one here present); that country might and probably would refuse to make the contribution required by the Imperial authority. How in this case is the contribution to be collected? To collect revenue at the point of the bayonet is an impossibility. It is therefore necessary that a scheme for adjusting the financial relations between the Imperial and national authorities should provide the former with sufficient sources of revenue to meet Imperial expenditure under all circumstances. Grants may have to be made from Imperial funds to meet national expenditure. Indeed, such a grant will certainly have to be made in some form or other, at any rate for a period, in the case of Ireland.

4. It is necessary to treat Ireland on exceptional lines.—This necessity does not only arise from the 100