Page:Popular Works of Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1889) Vol 2.djvu/143

 I say, does indeed raise itself above Experience;—whilst the other way of rising above Experience,—namely, by Knowledge,—has never presented itself to them in its true character, and on this side they have had, as yet, no temptations to overcome.

In this firm reliance on the world of Thought, as the Highest and most excellent, Reason as Knowledge and Mysticism are completely at one.

The distinction between them depends solely upon the nature of the thought from which they respectively proceed. The fundamental thought of Reason as Knowledge—which because it is a fundamental thought, is absolutely one and complete in itself—is, in the view of Reason, thoroughly clear and distinct; and from it Reason perceives, in the same unchangeable clearness, the immediate procession of all the multiplicity of particular thoughts; and, since things can only exist in thought, of the multiplicity of all particular things,—making them, in this procession, the subject of immediate apprehension;—this even to the limits of all clearness; and, as these limits must likewise be conceived of as necessary limits, even to the boundaries of the Unknown. Further, this thought does not spontaneously present itself to Reason, but must be pursued with labour, assiduity, and care; for Reason must never rest satisfied with anything which is, as yet, imperfectly understood, but must continually ascend to a higher principle of interpretation, and again to a higher, until at last there shall be but one pure mass of Light. So it is with the Thought of Reason. But the thoughts from which Mysticism may arise,—for these are very different in the different individuals who entertain them, and are even very variable in one and the same individual,—these thoughts can never be clearly referred to any fundamental principle. On this account they are only to a certain extent clear even in themselves; and, so far as regards their connexion with each other, they are